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ASEAN Civil Society under the 
Myanmar Chairmanship
Stefan Rother
The 2014 ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC) in Yangon, Myanmar, saw a record 
attendance and provided a surprisingly open space for civil society. But the opposing 
trends of democratic developments and authoritarian backlash in the member states 
have also had significant repercussions at the regional level.
Analysis
  In a time where civil liberties and human rights seem to be on the decline in the re-
gion (e.g. Brunei’s introduction of sharia law, the shooting of demonstrating textile 
workers in Cambodia, Thailand’s coup d’état), ASEAN civil society is presenting it-
self as organized as rarely before. But government crackdowns are on the rise, and 
nation states are denying civil society representatives space at the regional level. 
  Civil society has the potential to address the democratic deficit of regional organi-
zations by establishing alternative regionalism from below.
  Civil society can give voice to transnationally marginalized groups, such as migrant 
workers, whose interests are represented neither by their states of origin or resi-
dence nor at the regional level. 
  All justified doubts about the sincerity and sustainability of its transition process 
notwithstanding, Myanmar has currently opened up spaces for civil society advo-
cacy. National organizations can benefit from interactions with the regional level.
  ASEAN’s ambitious plan to establish a “people-centered” community is under-
mined by the reluctance of several member states to engage in dialogue with civ-
il society.
  When faced with attempts to limit its space for participation, civil society has to 
adopt either an “inside-outside” or “outsider by choice” approach. If it wants to be 
accepted as a legitimate partner, civil society has to be transparent about the sourc-
es of its own legitimacy and democratic internal structure. 
Keywords: ASEAN, civil society, democratization, regionalism, Myanmar, Southeast Asia, 
social movements, migration 
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The Democratic Deficit of Regional 
Organizations 
The democratic deficit has been an often lament-
ed aspect of European integration. But consider-
ing the existence of a parliament and regularly 
held elections, the European Union still displays 
more democratic features than most other region-
al organizations. A lack democracy is even more 
apparent in organizations such as ASEAN, where 
currently none of the 10 member states can be con-
sidered fully democratic according to the latest 
Freedom House Index.1 Besides having no direct 
input in ASEAN, the people of these states also 
have limited or no influence on their governments’ 
politics with regard to this regional-level organi-
zation. There are, however, actors who are trying 
to address this democratic gap – namely, transna-
tional civil society organizations (CSOs) that have 
formed networks in order to create space for their 
advocacy and participation. This increasingly in-
cludes the regional level.
These actors have the potential to create an “al-
ternative regionalism” from the ground up. The 
analysis provided here understands regions as a 
social construct and thus “examines the roles of 
not only states but also other varieties of non-state 
actors such as domestic firms, transnational cor-
porations, NGOs, and other types of social net-
works and social movements in the process of re-
gionalization” (Igarashi 2011: 4). Alternative re-
gionalism is not merely an academic concept, but 
one that has been brought forward explicitly by 
activists themselves. For instance, the People’s 
Agenda for Alternative Regionalisms (PAAR),2 
a network of networks with several civil society 
members from Southeast Asia, aims “to contrib-
ute to the understanding of alternative regional 
integration as a key strategy to struggle against 
neoliberal globalization and to broaden the base 
among key social actors for political debate and 
action around regional integration.”3 PAAR pro-
motes the concept of “people’s integration” in re-
gional processes, which clearly aims at democra-
tizing regionalism with the goal to “reclaim the 
1 Online: <www.freedomhouse.org/regions/asia-pacific#VAzf 
m2zlpD8>. 
2 PAAR was initiated by the activist research institutes Trans-
national Institute (TNI), Focus on the Global South, and the 
Hemispheric Social Alliance in “an effort to promote cross-
fertilisation of experiences on regional alternatives among so-
cial movements and civil society organisations.” 
3 Online: <www.alternative-regionalisms.org/>.
regions, recreate the processes of regional inte-
gration and advance people-centered regional al-
ternatives.”
ASEAN – A “People-Centered” Community?
There is increasing awareness among member 
states that not only grand projects such as the 
ASEAN Economic Community but also the con-
cerns of specific, often marginalized groups such 
as women, children, victims of trafficking and 
to some degree migrant workers are best dealt 
with on a regional basis (Manea 2009). Still, the 
“ASEAN way” with its emphasis on noninterfer-
ence in the domestic affairs of member countries 
is a deeply embedded norm in the regional polit-
ical culture (Rother 2012b). Member states often 
face difficulties in agreeing on issues such as en-
vironmental challenges and the treatment of mi-
grant workers because of significant discrepan-
cies in their respective economic development and 
thus bargaining power. Civil society has the po-
tential and ambition to address these “touchy” is-
sues, but the actual space provided for civil soci-
ety engagement at the ASEAN level is very limit-
ed. This stands in marked contrast to one of the 
most ambitious projects of the regional organi-
zation: the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community 
(ASCC), which was introduced as the third pil-
lar of the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II in 
2003. According to the ASCC blueprint published 
in 2009, the goal is to establish a “people-cen-
tered” community by “building a caring and shar-
ing society which is inclusive and harmonious 
where the well-being, livelihood, and welfare of 
the peoples are enhanced” (ASEAN 2009). Many 
of the major human rights demands of NGOs are 
mentioned in the publication, but such ambitious 
goals only find their way into regional declara-
tions and agreements in a watered-down form or 
not at all. 
The ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC) 
and the ASEAN Peoples’ Forum (APF)
Although designed as a space for civil society 
participation, the ACSC was originally initiated 
by the Malaysian government in 2005 – when it 
served as the ASEAN chair – to address CSOs’ in-
creasing dissatisfaction with the ASEAN People’s 
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Assembly, which was strictly modeled on a “se-
lectively inclusive corporatist structure of region-
al governance” (Rüland 2014: 254). Subsequent 
meetings were organized under the guidance of 
Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA), 
which is seen as the leading network attempting 
to engage ASEAN and comprises approximately 
100 national and regional organizations (Gerard 
2013: 417). Tellingly, SAPA and the ACSC (which 
has now merged with the APF) are affiliated net-
works of the aforementioned PAAR and adhere to 
its concept of democratizing regionalism. Through 
its counterhegemonic advocacy work, SAPA chal-
lenges ASEAN on a wide number of human rights–
related issues. There is, however, a certain frustra-
tion within SAPA regarding the fact that its annual 
resolutions rarely lead to specific outcomes.
Over the years, a consistent format for the 
ACSC/APF has been established. The conference 
takes place before the annual ASEAN summit, 
where the heads of government of each member 
state meet. Several days of plenary sessions and 
workshops result in the drafting of a “people’s 
statement” addressed to the ASEAN leaders. The 
declaration is presented at the “interface meet-
ing,” which brings together government represen-
tatives and civil society representatives from each 
ASEAN country. The appointment of these repre-
sentatives, however, has been a constant source of 
tension, with several authoritarian states reject-
ing the delegates selected by civil society and re-
placing them with representatives from so-called 
GONGOs (government-organized nongovernmen- 
tal organizations). 
In addition, the provision of physical and po-
litical space for ACSC/APF participants is very 
much dependent on the host government (i.e. the 
current chair of ASEAN). In previous years, there 
were allegations of restrictions and intimida-
tion. For instance, at the civil society meetings in 
Cambodia in 2012, participants were threatened 
with power cuts and being locked in the venue if 
sensitive issues such as land evictions were dis-
cussed (Gerard 2013: 420). CSOs also considered 
the meeting in Brunei Darussalam the following 
year to be a further disappointment.
Myanmar’s ASEAN Chair
Based on the aforementioned issues, one may 
have had understandably low expectations for 
civil society engagement under Myanmar’s chair-
manship of ASEAN. After all, even among its less 
than democratic fellow member states, Myanmar 
has for a long time been considered a pariah that 
had to be brought closer to the association through 
“constructive engagement.” In 2006, under duress 
from the United States and the European Union, 
ASEAN reluctantly denied Myanmar the chair-
manship of the association because of the antidem-
ocratic and oppressive practices of its government 
(Renshaw 2013). Five years later, in 2011, ASEAN 
awarded Myanmar the 2014 chairmanship on the 
basis of its confidence in Myanmar’s program of 
reform. Still, there was doubt whether Myanmar 
had either the resources to host the large number 
of meetings associated with the chairmanship or 
the political authority to address sensitive issues 
such as the South China Sea dispute. 
But observers have so far been surprised at 
how well Myanmar is handling its new position, 
several caveats and weaknesses notwithstand-
ing. For once, the chair was able to facilitate a 
consensus among the member states for a stron-
ger ASEAN voice vis-à-vis China on the maritime 
disputes in the South China Sea.4 Domestically, 
the country has, in accordance with the ASEAN 
blueprint, installed a national commission for hu-
man rights to which violations can be reported. So 
far, only Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the 
Philippines have set up similar institutions. But 
this development is also exemplary of the fragile 
nature of reform in Myanmar: a recent report by 
three NGOS (Burma Partnership, a national NGO, 
as well as Equality Myanmar and Forum-Asia, 
both regional NGOs) denounces the “continuing 
ineffectiveness” of the Myanmar National Human 
Rights Commission (MNHRC), in particular its 
failure to probe reports of human rights abus-
es amid the communal violence in Myanmar’s 
Rakhine state with its strong Rohingya popula-
tion and the armed conflict in the Kachin state.5 
The paper also questioned the independence of 
the commission from government influence. It is 
unclear whether the decision of Myanmar’s pres-
ident, Thein Sein, to reshuffle the MNHRC in the 
same week as the report was issued was a direct 
4 Online: <www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Mid-term-re 
view-of-Myanmars-Asean-chair-30241115.html>.
5 Online: <www.burmapartnership.org/2014/09/the-myanmar-
national-human-rights-commission-continues-failing-to-de-
liver/>. Myanmar is divided into several administrative sub-
divisions, among them seven states. Rohingya Muslims con-
stitute 20 percent of Rakhine state’s 3.1 million population. 
- 4 -GIGA Focus International Edition/English  10/2014
reaction. This event, however, highlights the in-
creasing prominence of national NGOs and the 
growing interdependence between them and re-
gional NGOs. 
Myanmar’s decision to release more than 3,000 
prisoners has also been linked to its ASEAN chair-
manship since the announcement came just one 
month before the Ninth East Asia Summit in 
November 2014, which was attended by the US 
president, Barack Obama, and other world lead-
ers. The national NGO Assistance Association for 
Political Prisoners (AAPP) pointed out that only 
three political prisoners were among the 3,073 to 
be released. The Asia-Pacific director of Amnesty 
International saw the release as an “empty ges-
ture” and claimed its timing “smacks of politi-
cal opportunism.”6 During his visit, Obama laud-
ed the democratization process in the country. 
However, young Burmese activists – many of 
whom had also participated in the ACSC/APF 
– expressed a different view during one of his 
speeches by holding up posters with slogans like 
“Reform is fake.”
In sum, Myanmar’s track record on human 
rights, press freedom, women’s rights, and the 
protection of religious and ethnic minorities re-
mains very uneven and rollbacks can happen at 
any time. The most divisive topic – one that has 
repercussions for other ASEAN member states 
and NGOs and also at the regional level – remains 
the plight of the Rohingya, the country’s Muslim 
minority. The controversy even extends to the use 
of the term “Rohingya,” which in Rohingya refers 
to “people from Rakhine” (formerly known as 
Arakane). However, the predominantly Buddhist 
majority in the state of Rakhine rejects the use of 
the term, instead referring to the Rohingya – as do 
many others in Myanmar – as “Bengalis.” By not 
accepting the Rohingya as one of the 130 ethnic 
races in Myanmar and instead classifying them as 
stateless Bengali Muslims from Bangladesh, the 
Burmese state has been denying them the right to 
citizenship since 1982 (Delius 2014).
This policy was reinforced in March 2014 when 
the Myanmar government did not allow Muslims 
to register as “Rohingya” in its first census in three 
decades. Discrimination and serious human rights 
violations were widespread under the junta re-
gime and have continued under the present gov-
6 Online: <www.uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/08/uk-myanm 
ar-prisoners-idUKKCN0HX0UG20141008>.
ernment. In 2012 the Rakhine state riots, which 
were sparked by an alleged case of rape, resulted 
in the killing and displacement of many Rohingya. 
While social media in Myanmar is full of agitated 
calls for the Rohingya to leave the country and “go 
home,” their alleged place of origin, Bangladesh, 
has not welcomed the group either. An estimat-
ed 1 million Rohingya have fled Myanmar (with 
around 800,000 remaining), many of them staying 
in Southeast Asian countries. In contrast, the re-
gion’s Muslim countries have been very outspo-
ken in their support of the Rohingya, thus mak-
ing their plight an ASEAN challenge and a natural 
cause for civil society. But the reluctance among 
the Burmese ACSC/APF participants to address 
the issue tarnished an otherwise impressive civil 
society gathering.
Hungry for Participation: The ACSC/APF in 
Yangon
While SAPA remains influential in the ACSC/APF, 
a comprehensive organizational structure for pre-
paring the meetings has been established over 
the years. To sustain the regional character of the 
event, the conference is organized by the region-
al networks and facilitated by CSOs from the chair 
country. There are eight committees and bodies, 
which includes drafting and finance and regional 
and national organizing committees. Preparatory 
meetings are held at both the national and region-
al levels. The high level of interest in the nation-
al events held before the Yangon conference indi-
cated that Myanmar civil society is “hungry” for a 
space in which it can participate and voice its con-
cerns. Still, the attendance at the actual conference 
exceeded all expectations: more than 3,000 indi-
viduals and delegates from CSOs and grassroots 
organizations representing the ASEAN region 
and Timor Leste as well as observers from aca-
demic and international organizations came to the 
Myanmar Convention Center – twice the number 
expected by organizers. Out of these, 2,275 par-
ticipants were from Myanmar, with participants 
from more remote regions often traveling for sev-
eral days to reach Yangon. 
Despite reports by participants and organiz-
ers that the government attempted to influence 
the agenda in the run-up and that secret police 
were present at the meeting, it still represents a 
landmark event for Myanmar civil society and the 
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region as a whole. In her opening speech, May 
May Pyone, chair of the ACSC/APF 2014 Steering 
Committee, described the gathering as a “show-
case event for civil society” and a “vital compo-
nent of the ASEAN project.” President Thein 
Sein sent a congratulatory message in which he 
spoke of a “watershed moment” for the peoples 
of ASEAN as well as goals such a lasting peace, 
the transition to a true democracy, social justice, 
and protection of the environment – all endeavors 
in which “the role of civil society is paramount” 
(ACSC/APF 2014).
Critics of gatherings like the ACSC/APF may 
see their reliance on symbolic measures, work-
shops, and speeches as a weakness and the final 
declarations as outcomes with no measurable ef-
fect on actual politics. But from the perspective of 
the organizers, the act of formulating such a dec-
laration is already part of the goal. For once, it en-
ables activists from the ASEAN member countries 
to network and search for common ground and to 
develop strategies addressing issues that are of-
ten transnational in nature. In the specific case of 
Myanmar, national civil society has a lot of catch-
ing up to do in terms of organizing, funding, ad-
vocacy, and strategic action. The aforementioned 
joint action between the national and regional lev-
els in exposing the shortcomings of the MNCHR 
can be seen as an example of such cooperation. 
Such meetings also provide regional networks 
with the opportunity to recruit and educate their 
members. The ACSC/APF also provides space for 
national and local activists to voice their concerns. 
For instance, in a plenary session titled “Myanmar 
in Transition,” Ko Moe Thwe, the secretary gener-
al of the National Youth Congress and president 
of Generation Wave (a prodemocracy Burmese 
youth movement) stated, “Our country is still un-
der a military government, the military has to-
tal control of the administration and legislation.” 
He blamed the dictatorship for systematically de-
stroying the country and leaving behind a deteri-
orating educational and economic system as well 
as endemic poverty. 
Another function of the ACSC/APF is to pro-
vide visibility and voice to often marginalized 
groups. Maybe the most notable example was the 
strong presence of LGBTIQ (lesbian, gay, bisexu-
al, transgender, intersex, and questioning) activ-
ists. Although not enforced in recent years, same-
sex activity is illegal in Myanmar. The situation, 
however, is much worse in Malaysia and Brunei 
– in the latter the sultan instated the death penal-
ty for homosexuality shortly after the 2014 ACSC/
APF. Also very visible in Yangon were sex work-
er activists carrying red umbrellas, signaling their 
cooperation with the Red Umbrella Fund, an ini-
tiative that came out of the Donor Collaboration to 
Advance the Human Rights of Sex Workers. 
The event workshops were divided into four 
clusters (peace, justice and human rights, devel-
opment, and democratization) and covered a wide 
range of issues, such as challenges in ceasefire and 
peace process negotiations, the promotion and pro-
tection of the rights of children on the move in 
ASEAN, and labor rights and migrant workers. 
The civil society–initiated Task Force on ASEAN 
Migrant Workers (TF-AMW) was among the hosts 
of these workshops. Its advocacy work is a prime 
example of alternative regionalism from below 
(Piper and Rother 2014), which refers to civil soci-
ety’s attempts to address shortcomings at the na-
tional and regional levels. For example, the TF-
AMW has come up with a proposal consisting of 
192 specific recommendations for an ASEAN in-
strument on the governance of labor migration, 
while migrant-sending and -receiving countries 
remain in a gridlock over this issue.
Most Burmese speakers in the program seemed 
reluctant to address the issue of the Rohingya, 
so it was up to the delegates from other ASEAN 
member states to repeatedly bring up the topic in 
several rounds of discussions, sometimes being 
met with opposition from nationalistic Burmese 
monks. Considering that even Aung San Suu Kyi 
has been remarkably reluctant to talk about the is-
sue, outside voices in the ACSC can help to give 
voice to a group that is marginalized even with-
in national civil society. Still, the cause of the 
Rohingya did not find its way into the final docu-
ment of the meeting.
Barring the exclusion of the Rohingya, the final 
declaration sought to be inclusive, which came at 
a price: ensuring that every group in attendance 
felt represented saw the discussion over the pre-
amble alone take up a large portion of the time 
reserved for adopting the final statement. Still, 
the document makes several clear statements on 
the challenges of Myanmar’s transition, ASEAN’s 
shortcomings in following its own blueprint, and 
specific issues related to the four clusters debat-
ed at the conference. Among those clusters were 
calls to guarantee the rights of all workers includ-
ing migrant workers, to address the widespread 
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discrimination of women, to establish an envi-
ronmental pillar in ASEAN, and to democratize 
ASEAN by providing space for civil society, par-
ticularly within ASEAN human rights institutions.
The limited time to debate the final resolution, 
the central role of the drafting committee, and 
the trade-off between inclusive and concise state-
ments are common challenges for all civil society 
conferences (e.g., World Social Fora) and events 
held parallel or counter to state-centric global gov-
ernance meetings (e.g., WTO or the Global Forum 
on Migration and Development) (Rother 2012a).
The Power of Youth? 
These challenges were also faced by the ASEAN 
Youth Forum (AYF), which held its sixth meet-
ing at Yangon University directly before the 
ACSC. Established in 2009 by the ASEAN Youth 
Movement, the AYF has in the past rather flown 
under the radar of ASEAN observers and re-
searchers – something that is very likely to change 
after the Myanmar gathering. Youth issues are 
of particular relevance in a region that includes 
countries like Cambodia, where around 40 per-
cent of the population is less than 20 years old. 
Because of the lack of prospects, these young peo-
ple are often forced into migration. For example, 
it is not uncommon for underage women from 
the Philippines or Indonesia to use fake identifi-
cation documents or criminal recruitment agen-
cies to find employment as domestic workers in 
Singapore or Malaysia. These young women ob-
viously constitute an especially vulnerable group.
The Yangon AYF declaration contained top-
ics similar to those on the ACSC agenda (of 
course, explicitly discussed from the perspective 
of young people), such as democracy, good gov-
ernance, anti–land grabbing, anti-trafficking, mi-
grant rights, the situation of sex workers, corrup-
tion, and LGBTIQ rights. The three-day meeting 
marked a significant step forward for the AYF in 
two regards: First, they managed to negotiate their 
own interface session with government represen-
tatives for the first time. Second, their call to be 
represented in the ACSC/APF Steering Committee 
found widespread support in September 2014. 
After all, the network claims to represent about 60 
percent of the total population (based on the AYF 
defining youth as including those up to the age of 
35) in the ASEAN region. 
ACSC, AYF, and the ASEAN Interface: Two 
Steps Forward, One Step Back?
After the euphoria created by the Yangon meet-
ings, the networks had to face some harsh political 
realities. Although Myanmar seemed determined 
to organize an inclusive 30-minute interface ses-
sion on 11 May during the 24th ASEAN Summit 
in Naypyidaw, the governments of Cambodia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore demanded to substi-
tute three civil society delegates with their own 
nominees. As a result, the whole ACSC delega-
tion withdrew from the interface, citing a clear 
breach of the principles consistently reiterated by 
civil society (i.e., meaningful dialogue, advance-
ment of people’s voices and advocacy, mutual re-
spect, and self-selection). The Regional Steering 
Committee and interface delegates emphasized 
that they had been flexible and would even have 
been willing to accept the rejection by govern-
ments of some civil society delegates as long as 
those delegates’ seats remained vacant. Replacing 
these delegates with GONGO nominees was not 
seen as an acceptable proposition. (Obviously, in 
authoritarian countries such as Vietnam all NGOs 
are GONGOs, but their representatives had been 
accepted beforehand by the ACSC.)
In contrast, the AYF chose a different strate-
gy. Although only three countries (Philippines, 
Indonesia, and Myanmar) were genuinely repre-
sented by selected delegates, the organizers still 
attended the meeting. This decision was made 
on the basis that all delegates, including govern-
ment-appointed youth, embraced and endorsed 
the Yangon Declaration. The opportunity to deliv-
er its fairly progressive agenda to the states rep-
resentatives outweighed the challenges of time, 
space, and genuine representation. Mark Barredo, 
an organizer from the Philippines, considered the 
meeting a success because “it was the first time 
that young people shifted their discourse from 
mere actors of cultural exchange to active and rele-
vant stakeholders for a youth-driven, rights-based, 
people-centred, sexuality-embracing, open, trans-
parent and accountable ASEAN community.”
Glorifying Civil Society?
ASEAN has formulated an ambitious goal that 
aims at establishing a “people-centered” commu-
nity. But these declarations ring hollow when seen 
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in the light of the actual space provided for civ-
il society participation. Despite the secretariat of 
the organization appearing to be open to engaging 
in dialogue, member countries such as Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Cambodia are sabotaging these ef-
forts by insisting on only talking to GONGOs – and 
thus pretty much to themselves. There may be ma-
ny justified doubts about the sincerity of the re-
forms in Myanmar, but in a climate where civil so-
ciety is seen as hostile, disruptive, and unpatriot-
ic by many ASEAN member countries, the former 
pariah state’s proclamations of support for civil 
society engagement at the regional level is still re-
markable. 
It is important, however, to refrain from over-
glorifying civil society, especially when contrast-
ing civil society advocacy with the bleak situa-
tion in the respective home country. Like any-
where else, civil society in Southeast Asia is very 
heterogenic: legitimacy and internal democratic 
structures are contested, while groups often have 
conflicting interests and compete with each oth-
er in the donor market. But as the Yangon meet-
ings have shown, Southeast Asian civil society is 
also able to create a sense of ASEAN communi-
ty and solidarity – something the states in the re-
gion have yet been able to achieve. Thus civil soci-
ety can play an important role in the region-build-
ing project by establishing alternative regionalism 
from below. Civil society networks also represent 
a largely untapped source of knowledge, input, 
and control measures for ASEAN. 
The Yangon meetings have demonstrated that 
the organizational level of ASEAN civil society 
has evolved significantly. The next summit, which 
is scheduled for March/April 2015 in Malaysia, 
might thus prove to be a litmus test for the will-
ingness of ASEAN to engage with its regional con-
stituency – especially since Malaysia has, on the 
one hand, initiated the ACSC process but, on the 
other hand, proven its unwillingness to accept civ-
il society as a legitimate counterpart. As Debbie 
Stothard, coordinator of the Alternative ASEAN 
Network on Burma and secretary general of the 
International Federation for Human Rights, re-
marked during the Yangon conference, “We need 
to send a message to our ASEAN leaders that if 
you want a more people-centered ASEAN, please 
listen to the people.”
References
ACSC/APF (2014), Proceedings of the ACSC/APF 
2014, Yangon.
ASEAN (2009), ASEAN socio-cultural community 
blueprint, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta.
Delius, U. (2014), Streit um Staatsbürgerschaft 
der Rohingya, in: U. Köster, P. Le Trong and 
C. Grein (eds), Handbuch Myanmar: Gesellschaft, 
Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur, Entwicklung, Berlin: 
Horlemann-Verlag, 359–365.
Gerard, K. (2013), From the ASEAN People’s 
Assembly to the ASEAN Civil Society Confer-
ence: the boundaries of civil society advocacy, 
in: Contemporary Politics, 19, 4, 411–426. 
Igarashi, S. (2011), The New Regional Order and 
Transnational Civil Society in Southeast Asia: 
Focusing on Alternative Regionalism from be-
low in the Process of Building the ASEAN Com-
munity, in: World Political Science Review, 7, 1.
Manea, G.-M. (2009), How and Why Interaction 
Matters: ASEAN’s Regional Identity and Human 
Rights, in: Cooperation and Conflict, 44, 1, 27–49.
Piper, N., and S. Rother (forthcoming), Alternative 
Regionalism from Below: democratising 
ASEAN’s migration governance, in: International 
Migration.
Renshaw, C. S. (2013), Democratic Transformation 
and Regional Institutions: The Case of Myanmar 
and ASEAN, in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian 
Affairs, 32, 1, 29–54.
Rother, S. (2012a), Standing in the Shadow of Civil 
Society? The 4th Global Forum on Migration 
and Development (GFMD) in Mexico, in: 
International Migration, 50, 1, 179–188.
Rother, S. (2012b) Wendt meets East: ASEAN cul-
tures of conflict and cooperation, in: Cooperation 
and Conflict, 47, 1, 49–67.
Rüland, J. (2014), The Limits of Democratizing 
Interest Representation: Asean’s Regional 
Corporatism and Normative Challenges, in: 
European Journal of International Relations, 20, 1, 
237–261.
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus
IM
P
R
IN
T
The GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies – Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien 
in Hamburg publishes the Focus series on Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and global issues. The 
GIGA Focus International Edition is edited and published by the GIGA. The views and opinions expressed 
are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institute. Authors alone are respon-
sible for the content of their articles. GIGA and the authors cannot be held liable for any errors and omissions, 
or for any consequences arising from the use of the information provided.
Editor: Robert Kappel; Series Editor: Hanspeter Mattes
Editorial Department: Errol Bailey and Kerstin Labusga
Contact: <giga-focus@giga-hamburg.de>; GIGA, Neuer Jungfernstieg 21, 20354 Hamburg, Germany
The GIGA Focus is an Open Access publication and can be read on the Internet and down-
loaded free of charge at <www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus>. According to the conditions 
of the Creative Commons licence Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 at <http://creative 
commons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/de/deed.en>, this publication may be freely duplicated, 
circulated and made accessible to the public. The particular conditions include the correct 
indication of the initial publication as GIGA Focus and no changes in or abbreviation of texts. 
  The Author 
Dr. Stefan Rother is a researcher and lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg, 
Germany. He is currently a research fellow at the Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies (FRIAS). He is 
a member of the Freiburg Southeast Asia Area Studies Program, supported by the German Federal Min-
istry of Education and Research (BMBF). His research focus is on international migration, global gover-
nance, social movements, regional integration, and non-/post-Western theories of international relations. 
E-mail: <stefan.rother@politik.uni-freiburg.de>, Website: <http://frias.uni-freiburg.de/en/people/present-
fellows/rother>, Blog: <http://gfmd-blog.com>. 
  GIGA Research
GIGA Research Programme 4 “Power, Norms and Governance in International Relations” examines sim-
ilarities and differences in the regional and global development of power and governance structures in-
volving government, nonstate and hybrid actors. 
The Research Team 3 “Comparative Regionalism Research” employs structure- and actor-centered diffu-
sion approaches dealing with isomorphism among organizations and tests their power to explain simi-
larities between regional institutions.
  GIGA Publications
Bünte, Marco, and Clara Portela (2012), Myanmar: The Beginning of Reforms and the End of Sanctions, GIGA 
Focus International Edition English, 3, online: <www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus/international-english>.
Dicke, Vera, and Heike Holbig (2014), Rising Sino-Vietnamese Tensions in the South China Sea, GIGA Focus 
International Edition English, 8, online: <www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus/international-english>.
Jetschke, Anja (2014), ASEAN as a Regional Organization: Security Conceptions and Practices, in: Stephan 
Aris and Andreas Wenger (eds), Regional Organisations and Security. Conceptions and Practices, London/
New York: Routledge, 81–98.
Jetschke, Anja (forthcoming), Export of Regional Governance: The case of ASEAN, in: Tanja Börzel and 
Vera van Hüllen (eds), Export of Regional Governance by Regional Organizations, Houndmills, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Jetschke, Anja, and Clara Portela (2013), ASEAN–EU Relations: From Regional Integration Assistance to 
Security Significance? GIGA Focus International Edition English, 3, online: <www.giga-hamburg.de/
giga-focus/international-english>.
Jetschke, Anja, and Tobias Lenz (2013), Does Regionalism Diffuse? A New Research Agenda for the Study 
of Regional Organizations, in: Journal of European Public Policy, 20, 4, 626–637.
Noesselt, Nele (2014), China and Socialist Countries: Role Change and Role Continuity, GIGA Working Papers, 
250, online: <www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers>.
